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Abstract
We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n + 1 players zero-
sum game. We suppose the existence of the n + 1-th player in addition to n players in the
main game, and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by the n + 1-th player.
Its strategic variable affects only the subsidies, and does not affect choice of strategies by
the n players in the main game. His objective function is the opposite of the sum of the
payoffs of the n players. We will show 1) The minimax theorem by Sion (Sion(1958))
implies the existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game. 2) The
maximin strategy of each player in {1, 2, . . . , n} with the minimax strategy of the n + 1-th
player is equivalent to the Nash equilibrium strategy of the n players non zero-sum game.
3) The existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game implies Sion’s
minimax theorem for pairs of each of the n players and the n + 1-th player.
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1 Introduction
We consider a formulation of a non zero-sum n players game by an n + 1 players zero-sum
game. We suppose the existence of the n+1-th player in addition to n players in the main game,
and virtual subsidies to the n players which is provided by the n + 1-th player. Its strategic
variable affects only the subsidies, and does not affect choice of strategies by the n players
in the main game. His objective function is the opposite of the sum of the payoffs of the n
players, then the game with n + 1 players, n players in the main game and the n + 1-th player,
is a zero-sum game.
We will show the following results.
1. The minimax theorem by Sion (Sion (1958)) implies the existence of Nash equilibrium
in the n players non zero-sum game.
2. The maximin strategy of each player in {1, 2, . . . , n} with the minimax strategy of the
n+1-th player is equivalent to theNash equilibrium strategy of the n players non zero-sum
game.
3. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game implies Sion’s
minimax theorem for pairs of each of the n players and the n + 1-th player.
2 The model and the minimax theorem
There are n players Player 1, 2, . . . , n in a non zero-sum game. The strategic variable of Player
i is denoted by xi. The common strategy space of the players is denoted by X , which is a
compact set. There exists another player, Player n+ 1. His strategic variable is f , We consider
virtual subsidies to each player other than Player n+1, ψ( f ), which is provided by Player n+1
and is equal for any player. It is zero at the equilibrium.
The payoff of Player i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} is written as
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = ϕi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) + ψ( f ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
The objective function of Player n + 1 is
pin+1 = −(pi1 + pi2 + . . . pin) = −
n∑
i=1
ϕi(x1, x2, . . . , xn) − nψ( f ).
The strategy space of Player n + 1 is denoted by F which is a compact set. Player n + 1 is not
a dummy player because he can determine the value of its strategic variable. We assume
min
f ∈F
ψ( f ) = 0.
Denote
a = argmin
f ∈F
ψ( f ).
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We postulate that this is unique. The game with Player 1, 2, . . . , n and Player n + 1 is a
zero-sum game because
pi1(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) + pi2(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) + · · · + pin(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f )
+pin+1(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = 0.
Sion’s minimax theorem (Sion (1958), Komiya (1988), Kindler (2005)) for a continuous
function is stated as follows.
Lemma 1. Let X and Y be non-void convex and compact subsets of two linear topological
spaces, and let f : X × Y → R be a function that is continuous and quasi-concave in the first
variable and continuous and quasi-convex in the second variable. Then
max
x∈X
min
y∈Y
f (x, y) = min
y∈Y
max
x∈X
f (x, y).
We follow the description of this theorem in Kindler (2005).
Let xk ’s for k , i be given, then pii is a function of xi and f . We can apply Lemma 1 to such
a situation, and get the following equation.
max
xi∈X
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = min
f ∈F
max
xi∈X
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ). (1)
Weassume that argmaxxi∈X min f ∈F pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ), argmin f ∈F maxxi∈X pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f )
and so on are unique, that is, single-valued. We also assume that the best responses of players
in any situation are unique.
3 The main results
Choice of f by Player n+1 has an effect only on the fixed subsidy for each player. The optimal
value of f for Player n + 1, which is equal to a, is determined independently of x1, x2, . . . ,
xn, and the optimal values of the strategic variables for Player 1, 2, . . . , n are determined
independently of f . We have
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) − ψ( f ) = pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, a) = ϕi(x1, x2, . . . , xn), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
for any value of f . Thus,
argmax
xi∈X
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = argmax
xi∈X
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, a) for any f ,
and
argmin
f ∈F
pii(x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = a, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}. (2)
First we show the following result.
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Theorem 1. 1. Sion’s minimax theorem (Lemma 1) implies the existence of Nash equilib-
rium in the non zero-sum main game.
2. The maximin strategy of each player in {1, 2, . . . , n} with the minimax strategy of Player
n + 1 is equivalent to its Nash equilibrium strategy of the non zero-sum main game.
Proof. Let (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n) be the solution of the following equation.


x˜1 = argmaxx1∈X min f ∈F pi1(x1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n, f )
x˜2 = argmaxx2∈X min f ∈F pi2(x˜1, x2, x˜3, . . . , x˜n, f )
. . .
x˜n = argmaxxn∈X min f ∈F pin(x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n−1, xn, f ).
Then, we have
max
xi∈X
min
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) = min
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, f ) (3)
=min
f ∈F
max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Since
pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, f ) ≤ max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
and
min
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, f ) = min
f ∈F
max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
we get
argmin
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, f ) = argmin
f ∈F
max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ), (4)
i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Because the game is zero-sum,
n∑
i=1
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) = −pin+1(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ).
Therefore, from (2)
argmin
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) (5)
= argmax
f ∈F
pin+1(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) = a, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
From (3), (4) and (5) we obtain
min
f ∈F
max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) = max
xi∈X
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, a) (6)
=min
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, f ) = pii(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n, a), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}
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(5) and (6) mean that (x1, x2, . . . , xn, f ) = (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n, a) is a Nash equilibrium of the
zero-sum game with n + 1 players.
x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n are determined independently of f . Thus,
max
xi∈X
ϕi(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n) = ϕi(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
Therefore, (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n) is a Nash equilibrium of the non zero-sum game with Player 1, 2,
. . . , n. 
Next we show
Theorem 2. The existence of Nash equilibrium in the n players non zero-sum game implies
Sion’s minimax theorem for pairs of Player i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n} and Player n + 1.
Proof. Let (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n) be a Nash equilibrium of the n players non zero-sum game. Conse-
quently,
ϕi(x˜1, . . . , x˜i, . . . , x˜n) ≥ ϕi(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n) for any xi, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.
This is based on the fact that there exists a value of xi, x
∗
i
, such that given x1, x2, . . . , xn other
than xi,
ϕi(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn) ≥ ϕi(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn) for any xi .
Thus,
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ) ≥ pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) for any xi and any value of f , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
Since
argmin
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ) = argmax
f ∈F
ψ( f ) = a,
we have
min
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, a) (7)
=min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
min
xn∈xn
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ), i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n − 1}.
On the other hand, since
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≤ pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ),
we have
max
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≤ max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ).
This inequality holds for any f . Thus,
max
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≤ min
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ).
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With (7), we obtain
max
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = min
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ), (8)
given x1, x2, . . . , xn other than xi. (7) and (8) imply
max
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, a),
min
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ).
From
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≤ pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, a),
and
max
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, a),
we have
argmax
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = argmax
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, a) = x
∗
i , i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1}.
We also have
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) ≥ pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ),
and
min
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = min
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ).
Therefore, we get
argmin
f ∈F
max
xi∈Xi
pii(x1, . . . , xi, . . . , xn, f ) = argmin
f ∈F
pii(x1, . . . , x
∗
i , . . . , xn, f ) = a, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n−1}.
Thus, if (x1, x2, . . . , xn) = (x˜1, x˜2, . . . , x˜n),
argmax
xi∈Xi
min
f ∈F
pii(x˜1, . . . , xi, . . . , x˜n, f ) = x˜i, i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}.

4 An example
Consider a three firms oligopoly with differentiated goods. There are Firm 1, 2 and 3. Assume
that the inverse demand functions are
p1 = a − x1 − bx2 − bx3,
p2 = a − bx1 − x2 − bx3,
p3 = a − bx1 − bx2 − x3,
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with 0 < b < 1. p1, p2, p3 are the prices of the goods of Firm 1, 2, 3. x1, x2, x3 are the outputs
of the firms. The cost functions of the firms with the subsidies are
c1(x1) = c1x1 − ( f − a)
2,
c2(x2) = c2x2 − ( f − a)
2,
and
c3(x3) = c3x3 − ( f − a)
2.
f is a non-negative number and a is a positive number. c1, c2, c3 are constant numbers. The
profits of the firms are
pi1 = (a − x1 − bx2 − bx3)x1 − c1x1 + ( f − a)
2,
pi2 = (a − bx1 − x2 − bx3)x2 − c2x2 + ( f − a)
2,
and
pi3 = (a − bx1 − bx2 − x3)x3 − c3x3 + ( f − a)
2.
The condition for minimization of pi1 with respect to f is
∂pi1
∂ f
= 2( f − a) = 0.
Thus, f = a. Substituting this into pi1,
pi1 | f=a = (a − x1 − bx2 − bx3)x1 − c1x1.
The condition for maximization of pi1 | f=a with respect to x1 is
∂ pi1 | f=a
∂x1
= a − 2x1 − bx2 − bx3 − c1 = 0.
Thus,
argmax
x1∈X
min
f ∈F
pi1(x1, x2, x3, f ) =
a − c1 − bx2 − bx3
2
.
Similarly, we get
argmax
x2∈X
min
f ∈F
pi2(x1, x2, x3, f ) =
a − c2 − bx1 − bx3
2
,
argmax
x3∈X
min
f ∈F
pi3(x1, x2, x3, f ) =
a − c3 − bx1 − bx2
2
.
Solving
x1 =
a − c1 − bx2 − bx3
2
,
x2 =
a − c2 − bx1 − bx3
2
,
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x3 =
a − c3 − bx1 − bx2
2
,
we obtain
x1 =
(2 − b)a + bc3 + bc2 − (2 + b)c1
2(2 − b)(b + 1)
,
x2 =
(2 − b)a + bc3 + bc1 − (2 + b)c2
2(2 − b)(b + 1)
,
x3 =
(2 − b)a + bc1 + bc2 − (2 + b)c3
2(2 − b)(b + 1)
.
They are the same as the equilibrium outputs of the oligopoly with Firm 1, 2 and 3.
In this paper we presented a zero-sum game formulation of a non zero-sum n players game
considering the n + 1-th player and virtual subsidies to the players provided by the n + 1-th
player.
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